Tuesday, 12 December 2006

Queer as God Intended

Introduction

Discussions on sexual ethics relating to homosexual practices often presuppose that the role of a pro-homosexuality advocate is that of an apologist. While arguments based on assumptions of the unnaturalness, immorality, and ungodliness of homosexual activities seldom need refutation; every claim of the opposite needs thorough verification. My ambition here is to turn the tables. Instead of defending homosexuality, I will discuss the unnaturalness and immorality of the heterosexual norm that prevents much of humankind from living in accordance with nature, good morals, and God's intention. But before I begin, I need to say something about the terminology and the articles I will discuss.

The term "homosexual" was coined by Austrian writer Karl-Maria Kertbeny in 1869 as part of his system for the classification of sexual types. He labelled men who are attracted to women "heterosexual" and men fond of masturbation "monosexual". Before Kertbeny, there was no specific term that could be used for all aspects of homosexuality. As we will see later, this has caused much confussion in the translation of older literature, where references to particular sexual practices often have been mistakenly linked to a "homosexual lifestyle". For the sake of clarity, I will avoid using terms in a way that could confuse things further. Homosexuality should be understood as meaning both the sexual practice and the emotional bounding between people or animals of the same physical sex.

My primary concerns in this discussion are two essays published in a collection entitled Contemporary Moral Problems, [1] edited by James E. White. These are John Corvino's "Why Shouldn't Tommy and Jim Have Sex? A Defense of Homosexuality" and David Bradshaw's "A Reply to Corvino". Since my position is that homosexuality is natural, morally justified, and part of divine diversity, I will concentrate on the latter. Both writers debate the legitimacy of homosexuality and seek to prove a moral justification for and against it respectively. I want to avoid that particular debate and instead focus on the legitimacy of homophobia, here defined as "fear or dislike of homosexuality and homosexual people".

Christendom and biblical scriptures play a significant role in the articles; therefore, it is reasonable to include God in this discussion. In a Scandinavian context—with its secular culture—the idea of God may seem old-fashioned. Even so, I must stress the importance God and the Philosophy of Religion play in the debate on human sexuality. For the sake of the argument, I will here assume that God does exist, and that the idea of God rests on cosmological and teleological arguments. These two lines of arguments are the most prominent in present-day monotheism. [2] The cosmological arguments hold that God is the creator of everything, a first primal source of all actions and every movement; the teleological arguments hold that God is the supreme designer of the complex world we live in. (The last argument has undergone some modernization the past century when Christian theologians have introduced the terms "creationism" and "intelligent design".) The two arguments are not always compatible, but they are nonetheless used simultaneously to define God. [3] This is how I will use the term "God" here.

1. According to Nature

Some defenders of homophobia claim a "natural disgust" for homosexuality—the feeling of repulsion is normal since homosexual activities are unnatural. This would forgive those who wish to stigmatize, discriminate, persecute, and kill homosexuals and others that nature and society consider queer. If nature tells us that someone's actions, behaviour, or identity is wrong, who are we to argue? If the queer do not like the treatment, they can change and become who they are meant to be according to nature. If they do not change, they deserve—or must expect—hostile treatment.

Seen in this argument is an extreme interpretation of the Natural Law Theory, a theory that comes in many forms but in short holds that "objective principles for social, legal, and moral behaviour that are derived from what is believed to be rational, ordered character of the world." [4]

1.1 God and the animals

An idea of a natural morality has been favoured by many philosophers of religion and monotheistic theologians, in my opinion because it provides an opportunity to apply metaphysical "visions" to the physical world and vice versa. The presence of God becomes more tangible if it can be detected in, and described from, nature. The problem—and I will discuss this more in a moment—is that nature is not fixed. We tend to see what we like and ignore the unpleasant parts. When we seek a natural morality, we tend to begin by studying animal behaviour. If we do that, we will learn that homosexuality is present in all types of animals. Moreover, in some species, homosexuality is more frequently practised than heterosexuality. [5] In that sense, studying nature will tell us that homosexuality is natural—and therefore God's will and morally good. However, by searching moral truths in nature we will also learn that non-consensual sex, incest, and paedophilia are common practice in parts of the animal world and consequently morally acceptable. Furthermore, we might find it difficult to gain moral justification for religious worship. (I know of no animals that engage in prayer.) So, if we were to act on the fundamental idea of the "homophobic argument" I mentioned earlier, we could end up justifying an accepting attitude towards rapists and child-molesters while at the same time promoting a witch-hunt against nuns and clergymen. And, needless to say, it would no longer be possible to defend the "natural disgust" for homosexuality.

Of the two essayists only Corvino writes about the homophobic argument based on the assumption that homosexuality does not exist in the animal world. In a short passage, he refers to two studies of sheep and seagulls. He also writes, "even if animals did not behave homosexually, that fact would not prove that homosexuality is immoral." This is entirely true. Although animal sexuality seems to play a less significant part in modern homophobia, it is still an important aspect of its history. [6] Animal studies can also provide us with information on the "unnaturalness" of using sexual organs for other purposes than reproduction—an argument used by Bradshaw, but in a somewhat bizarre context. He exemplifies his moral standpoint by comparing human same-sex intercourse to bestiality, which in effect is to compare rape to lovemaking.

I conclude that same-sex intercourse is a violation of the body's moral space, in the same way and for the same reasons as would be intercourse with an intelligent animal. Again, in saying this, I do not wish to transfer to homosexuality precisely the same feelings of disgust that (rightly) attach to bestiality. I readily concede that intercourse with an animal is worse than that with a human being of the same sex. The only likeness I wish to assert between same-sex intercourse and bestiality is that both are perversions, in that both involve a very fundamental abuse of the body. [7]

In his essay, Bradshaw makes two claims related to nature. Firstly, that intercourse with an animal is equivalent to human homosexuality in that neither can result in offspring; and secondly, that genital organs are for procreation only. These assumptions are often believed to be facts, but nature proves them wrong. Homosexuals can procreate and do so all the time. And genital stimulation serves many important purposes that have nothing to do with procreation, one being to confirm love and profound friendship. Besides, if sex without the intention of having children is immoral, then a truly morally good person must say no to any use of contraception. The Vatican advocates this hard-line approach to sex, but few Europeans and Americans seem to take this advice on morality seriously. [8] Most people recognize that our sexuality serves other, non-procreative purposes. Moreover, no people object to other bodily organs being used for numerous things. Corvino exemplifies with the mouth and its usefulness when we want to eat, talk, chew bubble gum, lick stamps, and kiss someone we love. Which of these mouth functions are the "natural" and "morally good" ones? The question is absurd, and so is the idea that our sexual organs only have one purpose.

Before I leave the subject of animal sexuality, I want to mention a few things that contradict the common belief that homosexuality jeopardizes the survival of the species. In an eminent book entitled Biological Exuberance: Animal Homosexuality and Natural Diversity, American biologist Bruce Bagemihl presents research and theories that support the idea of harmless, fulfilling and natural homosexuality. [9] In the book, he profiles about two hundred species with documented homosexual behaviour. In a chapter named "Not for Breeding Only: Reproduction on the Periphery of Life", Bagemihl discusses several theories on the evolutionary purpose of homosexuality. I find two of these interesting. The first theory reads that homosexual individuals help the community they live in by acting as "helper parents". The other theory reads that a "homosexual gene" gives individuals an advantage in procreation:

Suppose there were one gene that predisposed an individual to homosexuality, and another that predisposed an individual to heterosexuality. Those individuals who receive two homosexual genes (one from each parent) would be exclusively homosexual; other would receive two heterosexual genes and be exclusively heterosexual; while those receiving one of each would be bisexual. If individuals who have one homosexual and one heterosexual gene were somehow more successful at reproducing, then the gene for homosexuality would confer an advantage and would continue to be passed on, even though it would sometimes result in individuals who do not reproduce (those who receive a homosexual gene from each parent). [10]

Homosexual animals do procreate and bring up new generations. Some do it by occasional conception with an individual of the opposite sex, others by adoption, foster-parenting, or egg donation (birds). In other words, homosexual animals do what homosexual humans do when they are not prohibited by laws based on an idea of a natural morality.

Assuming now that God is the creator of nature and the designer of the world from which we ought to seek moral truth, what are the most sensible interpretations of the animal studies and genetic theories. Is it reasonable to believe that God condemns homosexuality? I say no.

1.2 God and humankind

The world is full of queer animals, so objective grounds for the immorality of homosexuality must be sought elsewhere in nature. As previously mentioned, Bradshaw pays much attention to the purpose of male and female genitalia, and makes a moral claim on that basis. However, he also writes of lust for members of the opposite sex based on their gender characteristics: "Every lover knows that love is more than simply a delight in the other qua individual; man also delights in the femininity of woman, and woman delights in the masculinity of man." [11] This argument—if it is one—is a "Bandwagon Fallacy", an argumentum ad populum. All it does is to appeal to the emotions of the large majority of heterosexuals in human society. However, it lies in the very definition of a homosexual person that he or she takes delight in the gender characteristics associated with the same sex. The fact that a majority finds delight in the opposite sex is irrelevant; and it is by no means an indicator of good morality. If it were, any minority could be labelled immoral. It is, nonetheless, a common defence of homophobia since familiarity and frequency often is assumed to comply with nature—the odd must be wrong.

Now it is precisely the masculinity or femininity of the beloved, in its physical dimension, that is engaged in the sexual act. This means that there is possible in the type of intercourse that I have described a certain integration among the physical act, the attitude of commitment it consummates, and the larger dimensions of human society. The act is a reenactment at a personal level of the drama of the mutual need, attraction, and union of man and woman that has been repeated in countless times and countless ways throughout human history. [12]

Bradshaw's argument appeals to our emotions rather than reason. We all find things that arouse us in people we fancy, not only heterosexuals. The proof for this can be found in nature. This is where the natural sciences play its part.

Recent research has shown that the sexual orientation is not a lifestyle choice, but a congenital quality. By studying the human brain, neurobiologists claim that our sexuality is indeed a part of our corporeal self. In short, it has been avowed that the early development of three types of nerve-cell nuclei (INAH3, SOM, and BST) determines our sexual preferences. The process begins in the foetal stage, and by the age of three or four, a person's sexual orientation and gender identification is set and programmed in the brain. [13]

This new knowledge of human sexuality has sparked a debate on terminology. Kertbeny's nineteenth-century classifications need amplification. It has therefore been suggested that the romantic and/or sexual attraction to females should be called gynophilia (from Greek gunē, "women" + philia, "love"), and attraction to males, androphilia (from Greek anēr, "male" + philia, "love"). [14] With these terms, the sex and gender identification of the person with the active attraction becomes less important. It is the object of lust and desire that matters. In other words, an androphile delights in the masculinity of man, while a gynophile delights in the femininity of woman. Needless to say, perhaps, is that the sex of the person expressing delight is vital for Bradshaw's argument, which I believe proves that it rests not upon an appreciation for the "delightful feeling" itself, but rather on sexism. Before Bradshaw can assert the moral value of someone's sense of delight, he must gain knowledge of the subject's bodily appearance. What, then, is the difference between this sort of homophobia and, say, racism.

Let us once again assume that God is the creator of nature and the designer of the world from which we ought to seek moral truth; what then are the most sensible interpretations of the neurobiological studies and nerve-cell theories. Is it reasonable to believe that God condemns homosexuality? I say no.

2. The Fragile Norm

Just as with the arguments directed against male homosexuality, an argument against the public acceptance of homosexuality as an equal alternative to heterosexual marriage can work at two levels. The first level argues that to give homosexuality the same sort of legitimacy as heterosexuality tends to destroy the delicate web of sanctions and incentives through which society channels the sexual impulse in a constructive direction. The second level argues that anyone who lives publicly as a homosexual by that very action endorses and helps propagate a sort of counterfeit good, a false alternative to the heterosexual norm. [15]

What Bradshaw says is that heterosexuality rests on a thin and fragile foundation. If it were to be challenged by homosexuality, it will degenerate, which in turn will cause social turmoil. To prevent this from happening, society must promote special treatment for heterosexuals and with force stigmatize the queer. Everything that might put homosexuals on equal terms with heterosexuals must be banned or declared immoral, and in order to preserve heterosexual supremacy, governments must adopt apartheid legislation. [16] This, in short, is my reading of Bradshaw's two levels of argument. Bradshaw's core argument is frank and easily observable when he states, "the argument is that the mutual attraction of male and female is so important to the foundations of society that to adopt a way of life that publicly and persistently repudiates it is a moral evil." [17]

Bradshaw's position is clear: homosexuals are evil by their very existence, unless they hide, change, or hate themselves. He does, however, point out that he is arguing his case against homosexuality out of love. "There is a cliché—a wholly true cliché—that one must hate the sin and love the sinner. I would add that part of loving the sinner is to hate the sin." [18] That is tough love to handle for those with brains programmed for same-sex love.

Is Bradshaw's argument falsifiable? Can it be refuted? I think it might be, and I will begin by venturing a daring comparison. Assuming it is a fact that homosexuals are so by nature, and that this is not considered a sound argument against their presumed moral evilness—why not expand this condemnation to other groups that threaten society in a similar fashion? To do that, let me revisit and elaborate on a though from the previous segment. As we could see, the nuns and clergymen cannot justify their lifestyle on the laws of nature since we know of no animals engaged in religious worship that requires celibacy. Corvino touches on this subject in his essay when he writes, "Perhaps it is true that if everyone were homosexual, there would be no society. But if everyone were a celibate priest, society would collapse just as surely…" [19] No one can argue with that. So it seems, but the most eager homophobes tend to be very religious, which force them to legitimize the inconsistent views held by their communions. The divine creator and designer of the world has little, if anything, to do with it. God's nature is too queer to be of any use when theological homophobia is about to be defended.

Note that religious celibates do not repudiate the heterosexual norm in the relevant way; they confirm it, for their celibacy is recognized by both themselves and others as a sacrifice made in pursuit of a higher good. Nor is there any repudiation in the attitude of those who, for whatever reason, simply do not feel or act upon an attraction to the opposite sex. The source of offence is proffering of homosexuality as an alternative to heterosexuality—an "alternative lifestyle," one capable of providing the same sort of companionship and sexual pleasure as heterosexual marriage. [20]

Remember now that Bradshaw's core argument against same-sex intercourse is that it does not comply with the form and function of human genitalia: the sole purpose of sexual organs being procreation. How can the choice not to exhaust the possibility to procreate be harmless to a society dependent on heterosexual procreation? I detect some desperation in Bradshaw's defence of abstinence from sex; he has not been able to give a satisfying explanation for how celibacy is less of a threat to society and the heterosexual norm than homosexuality. The truth of the matter is that while sexually active homosexuals use their sexual organs as God and nature intended, "celibaters" do not. Choosing not to engage in sexual activities may comply with religious beliefs, but it is to disobey God.

I will end this discussion with two comments on the idea of homosexuality as threat to society, good morals, and the heterosexual norm. My first comment concerns liberty. Much of the homophobic argument assumes that the amount of liberty is somehow static. Thus, if legislators put homosexuals on equal terms with heterosexuals, the latter will be deprived of some of their liberties. This an absurd, yet quite common, view on liberty. I have been confronted with it many times. Defenders of South African apartheid argued accordingly, and so did the Americans who favoured segregation in the Southern States. It is nonetheless an error in thinking. There is no restriction on liberty, at least not in its negative interpretation.

My second comment concerns the historical justification of homophobia. Historic records, religious literature, and philosophical writing from antiquity often play an important role in debates on homosexuality. People with my views often turn to Plato's Symposium when they wish to prove historic justification for a liberal approach to homosexuality. [21] Homophobes tend to rely on Plato's Laws to prove their point. [22] People motivated by religious beliefs do the same. Some, like Bradshaw, make sweeping statements: "It should be noted, however, that opposition to homosexuality is the dominant tradition in most the world's major religions, including not only Judaism and Christianity, but also Hinduism and Islam." [23] To this I, or anyone who shares my beliefs, could reply with a quote from David in the Books of Samuel: "I grieve for you, Jonathan my brother; you were very dear to me. Your love for me was wonderful, more wonderful than that of women." [24] I could also read the passages from the Koran that speak of God's promises of young men serving other men in heaven. [25] To a fellow student of philosophy I could recommend the love letters of Anselm of Canterbury. [26] The only thing I will accomplish with this, however, is that I get entangled in a rather meaningless effort to prove my point—meaningless because the proof is hidden in the sheer number of available literature on homosexuality. Homosexuality is nothing new, societies have survived with a tolerant attitude, and there are no indications to say that the phenomenon is in decline.

3. Conclusion

My ambition has been to discuss homophobia rather than homosexuality. I wished to turn the tables and prove that what is often assumed to legitimize anti-homosexual sentiments and ideas of unnaturalness lack the blessing by God and nature they thrive on. Instead, God, here assumed to be the creator of nature and the designer of the world from which we ought to seek moral truth, is telling us that homophobia is unnatural and a moral evil.

Notes

1. White (8th Edn., Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 2006).
2. See entry on "God, argument for the existence of", in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, ed. Ted Honderich (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 316.
3. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ, in Timothy McDermott (tr. and ed.), Selected Philosophical Writings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 200-2.
4. Gregory Pence, A Dictionary of Common Philosophical Terms (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2000), 37.
5. Bruce Bagemihl, Biological Exuberance: Animal Homosexuality and Natural Diversity (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 46-54.
6. John Boswell, Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 303-32. – Thomas Aquinas and other prominent theologians worked hard at finding the right animals to use as evidence of God's "natural law". Since all mammals seemed impossible to use as moral role models, Aquinas turned to birds. They, too, would later prove to be queer. His argument then shifted, and animal behaviour was no longer considered a source of moral guidance, but rather an example of wickedness.
7. Bradshaw, "A Reply to Corvino", in White, Contemporary Moral Problems, 282.
8. The Vatican, "Declaration on Sexual Ethics", in White, Contemporary Moral Problems, 260-5.
9. Bagemihl (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999).
10. Ibid. 173-4.
11. Bradshaw, in White, Contemporary Moral Problems, 281.
12. Ibid.
13. Annica Dahlström, "Könet sitter i hjärnan", Neo 3 (2006), 22-28.
14. The English and Greek spellings are taken from The New Oxford Dictionary of English, ed. Judy Pearsall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
15. Bradshaw, in White, Contemporary Moral Problems, 279.
16. Desmond Tutu uses this term in his foreword, in Vanessa Baird, Sex, Love, and Homophobia: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Lives (London: Amnesty International, 2004).
17. Bradshaw, in White, Contemporary Moral Problems, 278.
18. Ibid. 283.
19. Corvino, in White, Contemporary Moral Problems, 273.
20. Bradshaw, in White, Contemporary Moral Problems, 278.
21. See Martha Nussbaum, "Plato and Aristotle on Love", in White, Contemporary Moral Problems, 284.
22. See entry on "Homosexuality", in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, ed. Ted Honderich (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 373.
23. Bradshaw, in White, Contemporary Moral Problems, 279.
24. 2 Samuel 1:26
25. Omar Nahas, Islam en homoseksualiteit (Amsterdam: Bulaaq: 2001), 133-4.
26. Boswell 218-9.

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I gave this address to a philosophical symposium at Lund University on 13 December 2006.