Earlier today I discussed social power with Åsa Andersson and Magnus Jiborn, both philosophers at Lund University. The discussion was recorded by Swedish Radio. The programme is called "Filosofiska rummet" and will be broadcast nationally on 30 September.

The subject was Andersson's brand new doctoral dissertation entitled Power and Social Ontology and her theory of collective intentionality. I'm no expert, but I have written about social ontology in my online journal a few times, which is why I was invited to participate today.

Andersson, and social theorist John R. Searle before her, suggests that society is based on the formula: X counts as Y in context C. Translated to a social phenomenon, this formula can explain how certain things and persons are given a status recognized by the people in a particular society. An example could be that George Bush (X) counts as president (Y) in the United States (C).

I don't really have any problem with this formula, but I'm not convinced of the collective intentionality. As I see it, the individuals in a society don't necessarily share a common idea that exists independently of the individual mind. What makes Andersson's theory difficult is that it does not deny the importance of the individual mind, which makes falsifiability difficult—if not impossible.

I don't know how well I did in the discussion. Afterwards it felt good, although I blame myself for not bringing up some of my best arguments in favour of the reductionist view.

Update on 25 September: I have just learned that the programme has been postponed and will not air until October.