I have just read two books on terrorism: Jessica Stern’s Terror in the Name of God and Mark Juergensmeyer’s Terror in the Mind of God. The two titles are similar, but the two authors have somewhat different definitions of the terms terrorism and terrorist. In Stern’s opinion, a terrorist is someone who attacks non-combatants, i.e. civilians and unarmed people who are not participating in warfare. To Juergensmeyer , a terrorist is someone who has been found guilty of committing a terrorist act, or has been proven to planning to commit one. The two definitions may seem similar, but in my opinion, there is at least one important difference. While Stern is more empathetic towards the victims of terrorism, Juergensmeyer—judicially correct as his definition may be—is more inclined to protect the formal rights of the perpetrator. Furthermore, I think it is obvious the two writers base their viewpoints on two opposite theories of ethics. Stern has a more objective approach to terrorism than Juergensmeyer, whose take on the subject I consider morally relativistic: This becomes apparent when the latter writes about the term “terrorist”:
To a large extent the use of the term depends on one’s world view: if the world is perceived as peaceful, violent acts appear as terrorism. If the world is thought to be at war, violent acts may be regarded as legitimate. They may be seen as preemptive strikes, as defensive tactics in an ongoing battle, or as symbols indicating to the world that it is indeed in a state of grave and ultimate conflict. (Juergensmeyer 2003: 9)
There is no doubt in my mind that many terrorists and their supporters and apologists would subscribe to this imprecise definition of terrorism, and the open-mindedness it offers may serve a purpose when studying terrorism, but it is nonetheless unfair to the victims. We must remember that what separates terrorist acts of violence from regular warfare is the target. While legitimate warfare must follow the rules set out by international conventions—not least the Fourth Geneva Convention and its protection of civilians—terrorist warfare regularly disregard any such concerns. In fact—as Juergensmeyer points out when he writes about the conflict in Northern Ireland—the terrorist strategy is to attack civilians when they are the most vulnerable. Therefore, I think it is wrong to even suggest any uncertainty about what is terrorism. Stern offers the correct definition as set out by international law:
In this book terrorism will be defined as an act or threat of violence against non-combatants with the objective of exacting revenge, intimidating, or otherwise influencing an audience. This definition avoids limiting perpetrator or purpose. (Stern 2003: xx)
The two books both deal with religious terrorism, although it is not always easy to separate from political terrorism. In most cases examined in the books, it is hard to tell exactly what is religion and what is politics. Neither the Israeli-Palestinian conflict nor the American conflict over abortion is exclusively religious.
Juergensmeyer acknowledges that separating religious terrorism from political terrorism is difficult and must be done by context. However, he tries to point out where the line goes when he writes that religious terrorism holds a “transcendent moralism” and a concept of “cosmic war” that justify violent acts.
The very first sentence in Stern’s book says something interesting about terrorism sprung from religion that separates it from violence with secular motivation. She writes, “Religious terrorism arises from pain and loss and from impatience with a God who is slow to respond to our plight, who doesn’t answer.”
Like Juergensmeyer, Stern acknowledges the difficulty in separating religious violence from political violence, but she shares an interesting observation with her readers when she writes that religious terrorists are more violent and more inclined to target civilian people randomly. Victims are not picked because of who they are but because they are accessible. Most obvious about religious terrorists, however, is their will to establish religious laws and their use of religious texts to justify violence.
In the first part of his book, Juergensmeyer studies what he calls the “cultures of violence”. His running thesis throughout the book is that religious terrorists rarely act on their own. In fact, they would be nothing without their supporters and apologists who provide validation for their actions. The people who give ideological justification for acts of violence are just as important as those who execute them are.
I think Juergensmeyer is on to something very profound. Terrorists often think of themselves as heroes, but what is a hero without admirers. Diminish the fan base and the star will fall.
